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Premodern Secularism
Kiri PaRamoRe
This article argues that secularism is not an exclusively modern phenomenon, 
but is rather a recurring pattern which arises throughout different periods 
of premodern and modern history. I begin with a longue durée overview 
of Japanese history as a case study, proposing a regime of such historical 
cycles over a 1,200-year period. I then focus on changes in religious-
political relations which occurred in one specific, important cycle, through 
the transition from the late medieval into the early modern period. I argue 
that this period ushered in a new form of political-religious relations where 
Neo-Confucianism, instead of Buddhism, for the first time represented the 
religious element in Japanese politics. I demonstrate how this early modern 
regime of political-religious interaction supported by Neo-Confucianism was 
particularly stable and functioned to support public discourse. In conclusion, 
the article notes the destruction of this early modern form of political-religious 
relations during East Asian modernization, and suggests that the continuing 
lack of a stable regime of political-religious relations in both contemporary 
China and Japan can be seen as an ongoing legacy of that destruction.
Keywords: Confucianism, Neo-Confucianism, Buddhism, public sphere, 
political religion, early modern history, early modernity
[The Master] sacrificed to the dead as if they were present. He sacrificed to the spirits, 
as if the spirits were present.1
For over two thousand years, people in East Asia have thought about religious ritual in 
these “as if” terms. This reflective, relativizing consideration of the sociality of core ritual 
practices was identified with Confucius in one of the founding texts of the tradition, and 
institutionalized within an imperial state-sanctioned canon in the Han Dynasty (206BC–
220AD). It has functioned ever since as an established, mainstream way for the East Asian 
elite to think about what we would today call the nexus between politics and religion. East 
Asian premodernity thus had at its political, intellectual, and religious heart a relativization 
of ritual practice which invited interpretation in instrumentalist, agnostic, pluralist, reflexive 
and reflective terms.
1 Confucius Analects, Bayi (translation in Legge 1983, 3/12). 
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So much for Charles Taylor’s idea of a premodern “era of naïve religious faith.” 2 
East Asian society, elite society at least, seems to have already had a “reflective” approach 
to religion well before the common era. Seeing a ref lective attitude sits at the heart of 
Taylor’s preferred (third) definition of the secular, and as it is patently clear that East Asian 
conceptions of belief and ritual were reflective, and even relativist, does this not mean that 
premodern East Asian society was, at least if we follow Taylor’s definition, already “secular”?3
Of course, Taylor’s vision of premodernity as an “era of naïve religious faith” could 
just as well be problematized from the perspective of European history, and perhaps make 
similar claims.4 Taylor is very open in his book that his theories do not stand for any “world” 
other than that of “Western civilization.” 5 Even in that world, however, one wonders if 
reality gels with his vision of a “naïve” religiosity which, through the use of a couple of 
nonrepresentative examples like Hieronymus Bosch, he alleges held for the entire history 
of a kind of flattened West-European premodernity.6 I would suggest that Taylor’s position 
is actually only a slight detour from the stereotypical modernist vision of the premodern 
Western world where a naïve religious vision bereft of all reflectivity and rationality was 
only brought to an end through one of the twin triumphs of either the Enlightenment or 
Protestantism, or most often a conflation of the two. Taylor’s small amendment to this usual 
narrative of modernist West-European triumphalism is simply to replace Protestantism with 
a progressive Catholic-inflected vision of “humanism,” which Taylor links historically to 
the rise of Deism.7 This vision offered up by Taylor is simply a light progressive Catholic 
inflection of a familiar modernist Western narrative. 
If we accept, however, the view from some intellectual historians of Europe that 
Deism itself was at least partly the outcome of the Jesuit transmission of Confucian 
ideas from China to Europe in the seventeenth century, then we can see Confucianism 
striking back even in the European background to Taylor’s Deist-inf luenced definition 
of “secularism.” 8 The kind of pragmatic and highly relativized vision of religiosity we see 
in much of Confucianism was not only an earlier manifestation of what Taylor now calls 
Western secularism, but perhaps even part of its historic origin. It might be interesting to 
reflect upon whether modernist ideas of secularism, both those of Taylor and the original 
more obviously politicized sectarian Protestant outlooks he amends, are not all ultimately 
descended genealogically (through late Deism) from East Asian tradition, and Confucianism 
in particular. But let us leave that for another article. 
What the above discussion most certainly illustrates is that secularism, secularity, 
and secularization are all very slippery and highly politicized concepts. There is only one 
aspect shared by (nearly) all definitions of these: they arise together (sometimes in a causal 
relationship) with the global rise of a range of new sociopolitical constellations around the 
world that we now label modern. There are plenty of writers who see secularism as a bad 
thing, but even they criticize it as part of the modern, usually through a religious critique 
2 Taylor 2007, pp. 11, 19.
3 Taylor 2007, pp. 4, 20.
4 For one of many such problematizations from historians of medieval European religion, see Marty 2008.
5 Taylor 2007, p. 15.
6 Again, see Marty 2008.
7 Taylor 2007, p. 19.
8 Whelan 2009, p. 33.
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of an imagined secularized (or secularizing) modernity. Both critics and supporters thereby 
usually describe secularism as a destination somewhere towards the end of a linear narrative 
of historical developmentalism. Usually it is part of an ultimate modern destination (what 
was once Fukuyama’s end of history); sometimes it is an attribute of a modernity being 
surpassed in a more religiously reviving postmodern; but it is always modern. 
This article posits the possibility of secularism not being only a modern phenomenon, 
and not coming into being only through linear historical developments. It casts secularism 
as a recurring pattern that arises during processes of social upheaval. This article firstly 
presents a longue durée overview of Japanese history, proposing a regime of such historical 
cycles and defending it in general terms. It then focuses on changes in religious-political 
relations which occurred in one important cycle, through the transition from what 
historians usually call the late medieval into the early modern period of Japanese history. 
I conclude the article by considering how an analysis of this history might inform a more 
creative, useful, and transculturally applicable vision of secularism in relation to modern 
Japan, East Asia, and the modern world more broadly. The case study presented here 
involves Japanese history, but I would contend that the historical pattern described here 
holds also for at least China, and probably also for many other societies.
All definitions of secularism in recent scholarship similarly accept that religion is 
always present in human society, and always relates to the political in some way or other.9 
Secularism has in recent scholarship thus universally become a term through which the 
nature of that interaction is discussed. Secularism is no longer seen as positing any kind of 
absence of religion in totality, something I think we all now agree has never occurred at 
any time in the history of human society.10 In short, “secularism,” for the purposes of this 
article, is a term used to discuss dynamic changes in the regimes which govern the nature of 
interaction between the political and religious. 
At least for East Asia it seems clear that historical actors on the ground, already from 
the Han dynasty at the very latest, understood that religious action was a major constitutive 
part of politics, and discussed it as such. The quote from Confucius Analects which opens 
this article is just one of hundreds of examples available from the classical canons of East 
Asian religion and politics. These quotes indeed often form part of systematic schemes or 
regimes for the mediation of the role of religious ritual, belief, and practice in constituting 
a stable political order in East Asia. Relatively stable regimes of interaction between politics 
and religion have existed in East Asia since at least the Han dynasty. The formulation of 
the earliest stable Japanese states was also achieved in large part through borrowings from 
these same religiously plural, yet structurally deeply Confucian, trans-Asian regimes for the 
mediation of religious beliefs, affiliations, groups, rites, and practices in imperial statecraft.11 
The Cycles of Secularism
Organized Japanese states—the political of the political-religion nexus—emerged for the 
first time in an organized enough form to earn that name sometime in the middle of the 
first millennium A.D. Mythological, pseudo-historical, and historical records all indicate 
 9 Habermas 2008, 2010; Casanova 1994, 2012.
10 Such a consensus is represented in major multi-author works like Calhoun 2011. 
11 See Paramore 2016a.
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negotiation, controversy, and violence emerging around the settlement of one central 
question in the formation of these states: how should the political and religious interact? 
Importantly, these narratives all thereby assumed a conceptual differentiation between 
political and religious realms, which then in turn provided the basis for dynamic social 
action (including war) and the understanding of that action through the construction of 
historical narrative—for instance, in the Kojiki 古事記, Nihon shoki 日本書紀, and Shoku 
Nihongi 続日本記, all of which narrate war in politico-religious terms.12 
The important point to make here is that the conceptual separation of the political and 
religious is clearly not a modern phenomenon.13 Separation was perceived, institutionalized, 
and bitter; deadly political conflicts were fought out around the negotiation of a scheme to 
mediate those separated fields. Wars between the Mononobe and Soga (sixth century), or 
between Empress Shōtoku and her enemies (eighth century), or much later between radical 
Nichiren and traditional politico-religious forces did not see each side argue for either the 
complete abolition of religion from the political, or a complete sacralization of the political. 
They rather centered upon conflict between competing regimes for how those realms should 
be mediated. The conceptual existence of two realms was never in doubt.
Stabilization of the Japanese capital both politically and geographically in the Heian 
period (794–1185) included the establishment of what I would call the first longue durée 
cycle of Japanese secularism. That regime rested on the establishment of institutions and 
institutional practices which both separated and linked the imperial court and a number 
of Buddhist monastic institutions. This settled regime of interaction, although sometimes 
challenged, was relatively stable from the ninth through to the fifteenth century. The 
regime institutionalized religious-political relations through customs of interaction between 
a number of Buddhist clerical institutions (sangha 僧伽) and the aristocratic networks which 
constituted (or at least symbolized) the state. These customized, institutionalized regimes 
of relations included mutual participation in each other’s rituals, movement of personnel 
between them (retirement of nobles into monasteries), and family relations between 
governing members of institutions. These custom-based institutionalizations of relations 
both created stable mediation and interaction between the two, but importantly also clearly 
demarked their differences every time such an interaction occurred.14 This stable pattern 
of institutionally, culturally, and often biologically linked realms of sangha and aristocratic 
12 This is evident for instance in the conf licts narrated in Nihon shoki and Kojiki between the Soga and 
Mononobe (NST 1, NKBT 68, pp. 216–300), or in the eighth century between Empress Shōtoku and her 
enemies in Shoku Nihongi (SNKBT 14, pp. 174–443). Sometimes religious references are drawn directly from 
Confucian texts like the Book of Rites, notably in wars against “barbarian” emishi 蝦夷 in Northern Japan 
(NKBT 68, pp. 330–31). For a related discussion on the use of religion in defining military enemies of the 
state, see Ooms 2009, p. 168.
13 Kleine 2013. By conceptual, I do not mean linguistic. In this sense I use the word differently from Koselleck, 
who in my view has confused academic historians’ thinking about the relationship between concepts and 
languages. In a very Indo-European-centric manner, and without much attention to linguistic research, 
Koselleck’s research is based on the incorrect assumption that conceptualization occurs only through 
language. Psycholinguistic research makes clear that this is simply factually inaccurate (Nuyts and Pederson 
1999). Concepts can exist across different linguistic representations, and psychologically are not necessarily 
initially formed or transferred through language.
14 Adolphson 2000, pp. 21–50.
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power can be observed not only in Japan, but also in many other Buddhist-inf luenced 
countries through global history.15
Intriguingly, the f inal collapse of court rule and the rise of warrior shogunal 
governments at the end of the twelfth century barely interrupted this pattern. Rather, the 
same customs and methods of sangha-state integration were incorporated by the new ruling 
samurai nobility of the Kamakura shogunate, which also then integrated the new Zen 
clerical institutions along similar lines.16 The fact that the new political order of shogunate 
rule, and the new religious movements related to Zen, both fitted themselves into the 
existent regime of political-religious relations is remarkable proof of its perceived cultural 
embeddedness and political efficacy.
If we substitute the definite pragmatism of samurai political culture for the alleged 
rationality of the so-called European “enlightenment,” then this kind of stable relationship 
between the religious and political realms as the fulcrum of social order during the 
Kamakura shogunate could be said to conform to Habermas’s recent definition of 
secularism as “a two-fold learning process that compels the traditions of the Enlightenment 
and religious teachings to reflect on each other’s limits.” 17 Of course, in premodern Japan 
it was the aristocratic and warrior nobility rather than the enlightenment that formed the 
rational end of the equation. But surely warrior culture provided a much more concrete 
historical vehicle for the kind of rational and pragmatic political pluralism Habermas would 
project than the imagined normative value attached to such a fake historical-ideological 
construction as “the enlightenment.” 
The Medieval to Early Modern Transition
This long lasting regime of religious-political interaction, however, was finally brought to 
an end in the late fifteenth century with the rise of new visions of how the political and 
religious should be integrated. As in the early reformation movements of fifteenth and 
sixteenth century Europe, so too in Japan these visions often emerged from lay commoner 
religious affiliates, in concert with hierarchically lower-level religious institutions, who 
imagined a renewed and broadened vision of religious practice playing a role in challenging 
both the old religious institutionalism, and its symbiotic relationship with the establishment 
of worldly power and status. 
The most dramatic examples of this kind of movement in Japan were the Ikkō ikki 一向
一揆. Ikkō ikki were federated peasant states which arose independently of warrior (samurai) 
lord rule in the late fifteenth and sixteenth centuries and were related to each other through 
their shared practice of Shin Buddhism. Despite being identified by the word ikki 一揆, 
more usually used to describe short outbreaks of local revolt, Ikkō ikki were in many parts 
of Japan long running, fully functioning, stable units of governance: states that ruled for 
as long as a century. Parallels with early Protestant reformism include their disengagement 
(on the ground in the Ikkō ikki states themselves) from religious institutionalism, the links 
to an alternate social class of political leaders (in this case, wealthier peasants instead of 
samurai nobles), and a more immediate and independent soteriology. The Ikkō ikki marked 
15 Strathern 2007; Harris 2007. 
16 Collcutt 1981; Bodiford 1993.
17 Habermas 2008, p. 102.
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the end of the old order not so much because they offered a vision of a new regime of 
political-religious relations—after all, such visions had been presented before. Rather, the 
Ikkō ikki were different as an historical phenomenon because they sustained—sometimes 
for a century—a competing regime, thereby demonstrating its stability and presenting a 
persistent challenge to the old regime. That stability was particularly challenging for the old 
regime because it revealed that the old regime itself, represented both through its constituent 
orthodox Buddhist religious institutions (monastic, sangha), and traditional political centers 
(court and shogunate), was no longer capable of functioning as the center of either political 
rule or religious life in Japan.18 
Despite the Ikkō ikki being a real alternate political order which did function and 
survive for a long period of time, it was never national in scope, nor did it ever establish 
harmonious patterns of interaction with other powerful interests in society, like the samurai 
and court nobilities. The Ikkō ikki always remained an alternative form, particularly in 
terms of its radically different organization of social class. A new regime of political-
religious relations could not be realized under the Ikkō ikki ultimately because the Ikkō 
ikki were defeated in the military battles which finally unified Japan politically in the late 
1500s. Protestantism in Europe prevailed in establishing new dynamics of political-religious 
interaction primarily because Protestants were militarily victorious on a large enough scale 
and in many cases with armies led and funded by the new rising social classes that associated 
with the religious movement. In Japan, the peasant-led Ikkō ikki states were instead crushed 
by newly hegemonic military overlords, who reasserted a samurai dominated order, but in 
a new, much more hegemonic and centralized structure. This also led to the establishment 
of a new regime of political-religious interaction, one perhaps triggered by the challenge of 
movements like the Ikkō ikki, but not realized through them. 
In an outcome very different to what happened in many parts of early modern Europe, 
the religious reform movements and their class allies did not win the military conflict in 
Japan. Reformist religious movements, the religious side of the religious-political equation, 
did not lead to the creation of a new regime of interaction; rather, the reverse occurred. They 
were instead crushed by new samurai hegemons who represented a strengthening of the 
political power in relation to the traditional religious institutions. All three of the unifying 
hegemons of Japan—Oda Nobunaga, Toyotomi Hideyoshi, and Tokugawa Ieyasu—each 
more than the other looked to bring the traditional sangha institutions under stricter state 
control, just as they harnessed other organized social groups like merchant guilds, the 
imperial court aristocrats, and outcaste associations. This then was a complete change of the 
regime of interaction, but one carried out in reverse of what happened in Europe. Instead 
of the religious reformers originating a new settlement, the new settlement was imposed by 
those political leaders who militarily defeated the reformers. This is what Maruyama Masao 
has referred to as Japan’s process of early modern secularization, which he saw leading to 




This process gave birth to early modern systems of control, bringing religious power 
in general into confrontation with secular authority, religious influence in the end 
becoming completely subordinated to the latter in one of history’s great moments of 
change.19
Note that the European historiography that describes the triumph of Protestant reform 
in the political field in Europe, and the Japanese historiography that describes the total 
annihilation of religious-led reform in Japan, both characterize these very different 
outcomes as processes of early modern “secularization.” This is because both changes 
involved a process through which the interaction between the political and religious was 
totally changed. One “secularization” represented the transformation of political authority 
by a religious reform movement; the other represented the crushing of religious reform by 
resurgent political authority. While in Europe the narrative has secularization arising from 
religious reform impacting on the political, in Japan the narrative casts secularization as the 
act of political hegemons harnessing the religious. 
Early Modern Secularism
So what was the new regime of religious-political interaction that marked out early 
modernity in Japan? Was the long-term early modern settlement really what Maruyama 
implied—absolute state domination of religion, which fed into and underlay the (in 
his view, distorted) processes of Japanese political modernization in the nineteenth and 
twentieth centuries? I would suggest that even Maruyama’s own work demonstrates that 
not to be true. Maruyama’s first book, Studies in the Intellectual History of Tokugawa Japan, 
made clear the religious and political dynamism of the early modern period in this field 
of religious and political interaction.20 Crucially, however, he discussed this interaction 
mainly through reference to Confucian political thought, not Buddhism. I would suggest, 
therefore, that this complete state domination articulated by Maruyama only lasted through 
a transitional period of a few decades at most. Thereafter, and slowly arising throughout the 
course of the seventeenth century, there emerged a new but familiar reflective relationship 
between the two separate but socially interconnected fields of religiosity and politics, and 
this relationship was relatively stable for nearly two centuries thereafter. The reason this 
new regime is often overlooked is that it was no longer realized through Buddhism, but 
rather primarily (although not at all exclusively) through Confucian religiosity. This was 
mainly because, while Buddhism was targeted for heavy regulation and state integration, 
Confucianism, despite a few half-hearted attempts at suppression in the early 1600s, was left 
comparatively unhindered by the state for most of the Tokugawa period. Maruyama’s view 
that religion was shackled during the early modern period holds only if you equate religion 
in Japan with Buddhism, something many scholars unconsciously do. But if we expand our 
vision of religion to include Neo-Confucianism, then the picture looks very different.
Yes, Buddhist institutions were shackled as never before and integrated under state 
power through a new regulatory scheme that involved policies like compulsory temple 
registration. But there was another religious movement. In social and political history terms, 
19 Maruyama 2000, p. 120.
20 Maruyama 1952, 1974.
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from the Song dynasty onwards across East Asia, Neo-Confucianism had increasingly 
become the new Buddhism, or as Liang Qichao 梁啓超 endearingly called it over a 
hundred years ago, “Buddhism in Confucian clothes.” 21 Maruyama was right that the 
Tokugawa state, through its systems of regulation following closely on the heels of violent 
suppression, had shackled Buddhism. But he did not realize that in early modern East Asia 
the religion playing Buddhism’s traditional role was no longer Buddhism, but actually 
Neo-Confucianism. In Tokugawa Japan, as in Song and Ming China, religiosity was seen 
increasingly not through Buddhist institutions, but through a very different kind of less 
institutionalized social integration of Confucianism and related traditions. This social 
integration resonates with patterns of early modernity throughout global history, being 
based in bürgerlich, socially integrated but relatively loose urban middle-class institutions 
like reading circles, discussion groups, and informal schools, rather than in the traditional, 
premodern, more heavily institutionalized monasteries and temples of traditional Buddhism.
The new way that Neo-Confucianism was perceived in religious terms in the early 
Tokugawa period is most clearly demonstrated by the suppression of Confucianism that 
prevailed under the early Tokugawa state. Arai Hakuseki 新井白石, a major mid-Tokugawa 
Confucian, described it in the following way:
Under the previous [first four] shoguns, even superior persons mistook those who spoke 
about Confucianism for followers of Christianity. This was the situation until I first 
began to study.22 
As Bodart-Bailey has used this quote from Arai Hakuseki to explain, and as I have 
discussed using earlier examples, serious suppression of religion during the first decades of 
Tokugawa rule focused to a large extent on Neo-Confucianism.23 It was a suppression which 
clearly perceived Neo-Confucianism as similar to such traditions as Catholicism, as well as 
militarist and way of heaven thought and populist trends in Buddhism. It is quite clear that 
members of the elite in early Tokugawa Japan saw Neo-Confucianism primarily as a form 
of religiosity, in parallel with Buddhism and Christianity. In identifying Neo-Confucianism 
in religious terms, suppressors of religion clearly saw similarities with both Catholicism and 
state-proscribed forms of populist Buddhism. 
Importantly, the Confucianism that emerged from this brief period of suppression, 
and continued virtually unhindered by political forces until the Meiji Restoration, was also 
highly religious in nature. This has been emphasized in much recent Japanese scholarship 
on the early modern period. Over the last three decades, Japanese scholars of seventeenth-
century history have described it as arising out of a general milieu of religious activity 
that actually emphasized “the individual’s way of living in real society,” “the nature of the 
subject’s individual morals, rather than aspects of social system, organization or structure.” 24 
In other words, Confucianism’s sociality in the very early Tokugawa period, when it first 
emerged into popular culture, is currently seen in mainstream Japanese scholarship as the 
21 Liang 1985, p. 7.
22 Arai 1907, p. 550; Bodart-Bailey 1993, p. 300.
23 Bodart-Bailey 1993; Paramore 2009, pp. 78–102.
24 Bitō 1993, pp. 32–35.
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product of a tension between Neo-Confucianism’s regimes of individualized practice on the 
one hand, and the reality of the Tokugawa political order on the other.
Ōkuwa Hitoshi 大桑斉, one of the most important contemporary writers on medieval 
and early modern Japanese religion, recently argued that the rise of Confucianism in 
seventeenth-century Japan should be explained in terms of popular demand for the kind of 
religiosity that Neo-Confucianism was able to provide. Rather than being an imposition by 
the state, seventeenth century Japanese forms of Confucianism and Confucian-indigenous 
syncretism responded to the norms of the general population, whose “daily lives relied 
on religion.” 25 In this narrative, the embracing of Neo-Confucian religious sensibilities 
was key to the sudden and meteoric rise of Confucianism in early Tokugawa Japan. Neo-
Confucianism afforded a new kind of individual-centric moral religious practice in Japan 
where an inherently political (although usually not governing) character often obtained. 
In this political, as well as religious sense, it came to fill the spaces left by the Ikkō ikki 
insurgencies, Catholicism, other supressed popular religious traditions, and even the 
traditional Buddhist sects now shackled by Tokugawa regulation. 
The development of Confucianism through the Tokugawa period, and notably the 
way it interacted with politics, exhibited a strong religious character. Its most powerful and 
persistent religious elements were the various regimes for the practice of Neo-Confucian 
self-cultivation, which were emphasized in nearly every different Confucian tendency in 
this period.26 Self-cultivation also provided a framework for thinking about the nature of 
political-religious relations or, put simply, the relationship between Confucian practitioners 
and the feudal state. As Watanabe Hiroshi 渡辺浩 has pointed out, Neo-Confucian 
self-cultivation seems to have facilitated Confucian inf luence upon politics, while also 
highlighting moral separation from it. He sees both being established and maintained 
through a regime of religious-political relations ordered through acts of self-discipline 
and social compartmentalization, carried out by Confucians themselves as part of a Neo-
Confucian religious practice. Watanabe contrasts this to the actions of later Sorai school 
徂徠学 Confucians, attributing their relative political disengagement and weakness after 
Ogyū Sorai’s 荻生徂徠 own death in 1728 to their lack of self-cultivation practice.27 
Western-language literature often overlooked the fact that during the late Tokugawa 
period Neo-Confucianism, or Song learning, was not only increasingly popular, but also 
much more politically activist, radical, and effective than Sorai Confucianism, but this has 
recently been reemphasized in scholarly writings by both Watanabe and Maeda Tsutomu 
前田勉.28
As Maeda has pointed out, however, Sorai Confucianism also created other important 
practices which would increasingly affect politics in the late Tokugawa period. The practice 
of “social reading” (kaidoku 会読), although seemingly established in Sorai’s school, was 
most ardently taken up by Neo-Confucians in the latter half of the eighteenth century, and 
was also very popular as a pedagogically, socially, and politically central form of critical 
25 Ōkuwa 2012, p. 114.
26 Paramore 2016b, pp. 41–65; Sawada 1993, 2004; De Bary 1981, 1989.
27 Watanabe 2012, p. 185.
28 Watanabe 2010, 2012; Maeda 2009, 2012; Makabe 2007.
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practice among many other forms of Tokugawa learning, notably in Dutch studies and 
nativism.29 
Ogyū Sorai’s critical stance towards Neo-Confucianism is usually emphasized in 
scholarly considerations of his impact on Tokugawa society. However, the main new 
scholarly practice he implemented was social reading, which was perhaps even more 
influential. For Ogyū himself it was a core method of reaching the religious truth of the 
Confucian way. Ogyū mentioned social reading in his instructions for students, Master 
Sorai’s Responsals (Sorai sensei tōmonsho 徂徠先生答問書), a pamphlet published in 1726. 
Following his overall methodology of recovery of the ancient way, Ogyū described pedagogy 
here as a kind of ritualized attempt to recreate the scholarly practice of idealized ancient 
times.
In ancient times they used the word “friend-master [master and friend].” Through the 
cultivation of friendship they spread knowledge and advanced learning.… A school 
atmosphere permeated by friendly exchange was the most important element [in the 
ideal educational practices of the ancients].30 
Social reading is mentioned fairly shortly after this in another passage discussing the 
method through which texts should be read. 
When one meets with people from the same town and carries out social reading 
amongst a group of friends, then sometimes East will be mentioned and East will be 
understood. In far-f lung places, where one lacks the support of friends, scholarship 
cannot be undertaken very easily.31
Here Ogyū is talking about how to approach a text, but his key point is that the participant 
in social reading should not seek to use the group dynamic simply to push earlier views, 
but rather through cooperation and discussion to arrive at new understandings. This is 
what underlay the technique’s capacity to facilitate political discussion within scholarly 
communities in Japan through the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries.32 Social reading, 
both in practice and in its original conception by Ogyū, thus resonates with more 
contemporary ideas of reasonable discussion we can see in works on the public sphere by 
much more recent political philosophers like Habermas.33 
Later state institutionalization of social reading further demonstrated the relationship 
between the openness to interpretation inherent in this practice, and the political potential 
of public sphere discourse that some Confucians saw as inherent within it. Although first 
launched in Sorai’s schools, social reading was institutionalized most powerfully by Neo-
Confucian scholars who competed against the Sorai school during the late-eighteenth 
29 Maeda 2009, pp. 13–25.
30 NKBT 94, p. 171.
31 NKBT 94, p. 173; Ogyū and Yamashita 1994, p. 93.
32 See also Janine Sawada’s connection of Sorai’s invention of social reading to Jinsai’s earlier use of sakumon 





century state reforms led by Matsudaira Sadanobu 松平定信. Bitō Jishū 尾藤二洲, a 
Confucian scholar originally based in the Kansai, and later one of Matsudaira’s key 
professorial appointees at the Shogunal Confucian Academy (Shōheizaka Gakumonjo 
昌平坂学問所) in Edo, linked the practice of social reading to the Neo-Confucian Zhu Xi 
朱熹 idea of the “impartial mind” (Jp. kyoshin; Ch. xuxin 虚心).34 This was picked up in the 
way domainal school ordinances (which, in comparison to most private school ordinances, 
have been better preserved in state archives) described social reading. 
When one is carrying out social reading, one must maintain an impartial mind and a 
balanced mood so that this practice benefits you. You should not emphasize convincing 
others of a previously held position or adopt an argumentative tone of voice.35
This example from the regulations of the Kōbe domain school Kyōrindō 杏林堂 shows 
“social reading” being deployed by Neo-Confucians not only as an intellectual, pedagogical, 
and communicative technique, but also as a form of self-cultivation. Many other references 
of this kind indicate that, at least by the turn of the nineteenth century, social reading was 
the standard approach to education in the resurgent network of Neo-Confucian schools 
in Japan. The adoption of this practice by Neo-Confucian schools is important, not only 
because the new state institutions and examinations were all run by Neo-Confucians, but 
also because the domainal and private Neo-Confucian schools in the late eighteenth and 
nineteenth centuries experienced a resurgence of popularity at the expense of Sorai school 
institutions.36
The later social interpretations of social reading thus also led to a combination of 
educative public practice with individual religious practice in mid to late Tokugawa Neo-
Confucianism. The combination provided a robust basis for individual engagement 
with the public sphere in the Tokugawa order. The same figures who were central in 
institutionalizing “social reading” practice into state schools also cut down on practices like 
“lecturing,” which were more hierarchical and only facilitated one-way communication. As 
Shibano Ritsuzan 柴野栗山, another Shogunal Confucian Academy professor put it, “they 
[samurai] don’t listen to lectures, no matter what you are saying.” 37 In this sense, Matsudaira 
Sadanobu can be seen to have played a role in further spreading and strengthening practices 
associated with the growth of a public sphere discourse around Confucianism, or in the 
construction of what we might call a Confucian public sphere.
Bitō Jishū, defining the way around the turn of the nineteenth century, used the word 
that is now used in modern Japanese to refer to “publicness.” 38
34 Maeda 2009, pp. 26–27.
35 Monbusho 1903, p. 110.
36 Ishikawa 1977, pp. 256–58.
37 Shibano, in Takimoto 1914, p. 143.
38 Bitō uses the character kō 公, which at the time most often signified the state (domain or lord, shogunate or 
shogun). The context of its use here, however, demonstrates that the term was already moving towards the 
modern meaning of “public,” as is indicated by Bitō linking it directly, together with Heaven and Earth, to 
the universal and normative value of (inherently good) human nature (sei 性).
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The way is the Principle of Heaven, Earth, and the Public. People receive this through 
human nature. The sages made learning to cultivate this.… Without the impartial 
mind, the way cannot be elucidated. Without a balanced mood, it cannot be related to 
substantial issues. You cannot construct the way with [just] impartiality and balance. 
But in order to advance the way one must most definitely begin with impartiality and 
balance.39
It was clear his idea of an “impartial mind,” and its relationship to discussion of 
controversial issues, was central to his conception of the political way, which for him was 
intimately related to Confucian education.40 The openness and reasonableness inherent in 
this approach resonates with contemporary theories of thinkers like Habermas or Rawls, 
who rely on “reasonableness” in public debate as one of the core preconditions necessary for 
a functional public sphere.41
An example of how robust political criticism had become by the late eighteenth 
century is provided by a widely distributed memorial written by Koga Seiri 古賀精里 to his 
feudal lord. Koga was at the time head of the Saga domain’s academy, and very soon after 
was appointed one of the leaders of the shogunal academy in Edo.
As our country is under a regime of generals, the path of selection/election is closed. 
Particularly in domains such as ours [Saga], the damage of the hereditary system is 
not to be avoided. Those with hereditary status are negligent, and those without do 
not serve. This is why the spirit of the gentleman/samurai cannot be enacted, and why 
custom can so degenerate.42 
Orthodox state Neo-Confucians of the mid and late Tokugawa period, like Koga, were a 
far cry from fawning lackeys like Hayashi Razan 林羅山. There had been a clear change in 
the nature of discourse, so that even state-aligned scholars were now in a position to criticize 
trenchantly the underlying structures of the polity in certain circumstances and media. But 
they were also capable, usually, of tempering their opinions, of withdrawing to a reasonable, 
sustainable position of engagement with the reality of the polity. As Maeda Tsutomu and 
Watanabe Hiroshi have both recently pointed out, this tempering allowed late Tokugawa 
Neo-Confucians to sustain their social critique over a long period. Mid to late Tokugawa 
period Neo-Confucianism in particular, more so than other intellectual streams or forms of 
Confucianism in Japan, developed a robust capacity to sustain public debate over a range of 
issues, including issues in tension with Tokugawa state policy.43
Neo-Confucian figures in the Japanese Confucian world of the late eighteenth and 
early nineteenth centuries as diverse as Rai Shunsui 頼春水, Rai San’yō 頼山陽, Koga 
Seiri, Koga Tōan 古賀侗庵, Bitō Jishū, and Shibano Ritsuzan all managed to combine 
39 NST 47, pp. 261–67.
40 On the difference between the meaning of publicness in the late Tokugawa period and today, see Watanabe 
2012, pp. 51–52.
41 Rawls’s linkage of rationality and goodness in A Theory of Justice resonates with the particular articulation of 
Neo-Confucianism we see in the late Tokugawa shogunate (Rawls 1999, pp. 347–90). 
42 Koga in Takimoto 1914, p. 160.
43 Maeda 2009, pp. 24–25; Watanabe 2012, pp. 181–95.
Premodern Secularism
33
Confucian activity and later often high office in the emerging state academic institutions 
with sometimes trenchant critiques of the status quo. This required a combination of 
reasonableness and practicality, which Watanabe relates to their practice of self-cultivation, 
entailing as it did self-discipline and also the hope of attaining a state of grace on an 
individual level, even if activity in the social world (externalized political activity) was not 
working out.44 
In short, through the early modern period, Japan increasingly evolved into a stable 
regime where Neo-Confucianism functioned as the religious element in an increasingly 
institutionalized stable interrelation between the religious and the political. This regime 
of course came to an abrupt end with the overthrow of the Tokugawa state, and most 
notably with the deliberate and targeted attacks on Confucianism and Confucian 
institutions that followed quickly on its heels. The early Meiji state’s disestablishment 
of Confucian institutions, its appropriation of Confucian sites and spaces, and then its 
deliberate undermining of the tradition in a variety of ways thereafter followed the general 
antireligious program carried out against Buddhist and other religious groups.45 This is 
again proof that Confucianism at the end of the Tokugawa period, just as at its beginning, 
was clearly perceived by actors on the ground as similar to other religious traditions, and 
targeted accordingly. As I have argued elsewhere, the damage to Confucianism was much 
worse than that done to Buddhism, mainly because the Meiji state displaced Confucianism 
more comprehensively both from its traditional spaces of practice, and from its traditionally 
key role in education.46 
Epilogue
For the story of political-religious relations after Meiji, and the emergence of new regimes, I 
refer the reader to other articles in this special issue. One simple observation I would make 
is that once Confucianism was gone, no happy balance ever seems to have been found 
again. Instead the religious sphere represented, and continues to represent, a politically 
unstable and potentially disruptive element in general society. Intriguingly, this is the 
case not only in Japan, but also in other East Asian countries, most notably in China. I 
see this as a direct result of the crushing of the mutually supportive regime of religious-
political interaction facilitated by Confucianism. Buddhism, having been displaced from 
that role already four hundred years earlier, could not play that role in modern Japan and 
does not today. Meanwhile, no replacement has been found for Confucianism. The modern 
conceptualization of religion in East Asia inherently excludes rationalism and politics—an 
important reason why Confucianism itself is often excluded from the category of religion 
in East Asia, and also why East Asian states tend to be so ambivalent toward religion 
in general. The modern conception of religion in East Asia is thereby almost inherently 
designed to exclude a harmonious political-religious integrative regime. But again, that is 
another topic.
What was missing after modernization was the mediation of the political by the 
religious, previously carried out through activist Confucianism. This meant that the 
44 Watanabe 2012, p. 185.
45 Makabe 2007, pp. 23–27; Ketelaar 1990.
46 Paramore 2016b, pp. 141–49.
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religious side of the political-religious interaction, and the social and political reflectiveness 
this represented, died as its institutional bases in education were monopolistically occupied 
by the new modern state. This occupation was what created the kind of secularism 
Maruyama was referring to, which I would characterize not as state domination of the 
religious, but rather as state monopolization of the fields of critical political expression and 
education that Confucianism had previously occupied. This destruction of a stable regime 
of political-religious relations, and the continuing vacuum it has created, contributed to the 
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